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Abstract 
 
 Many models of markets are based on assumptions of rationality, transparency, 
efficiency, and homogeneity in various combinations.  They assume, at least implicitly, that 
decision makers understand the structure of the market and how it produces the dynamics 
which can be observed or might potentially occur.  Are these models acceptable 
simplifications, or can they be seriously misleading?  The research described in this article 
explains why markets routinely and repeatedly make “mistakes” that are inconsistent with the 
simplifying assumptions.  System Dynamics models are used to show how misestimating 
demand growth, allowing financial discipline to lapse, unrealistic business planning, and 
misperception of technology trajectories can produce disastrously wrong business decisions.  
The undesirable outcomes could include vicious cycles of investment and profitability, 
market bubbles, accelerated commoditization, excessive investment in dead-end 
technologies, giving up on a product that becomes a huge success, waiting too long to 
reinvent legacy companies, and changes in market leadership.  The article illuminates the 
effects of bounded rationality, imperfect information, and fragmentation of decision making.  
Decision makers rely on simple mental models which have serious limitations.  They become 
increasingly deficient as problems grow more complex, as the environment changes more 
rapidly, and as the number of decision makers increases.  The amplification and tipping 
dynamics typical of highly coupled systems, for example, bandwagon, network, and lemming 
effects, are not anticipated.  Examples are drawn from airlines, telecommunications, IT, 
aerospace, energy, and media.  The key conclusions in this article are about the critical roles 
of behavioral factors in the evolution of markets. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Research into a wide range of markets at different stages of maturity and 
liberalization, e.g., airlines, telecommunications, energy, steel, shipping, aircraft, IT, media, 
and pharmaceuticals, has revealed recurring patterns of dysfunctional, counter-productive 
behavior (Weil 1996; Weil and Stoughton 1998; Stoughton 2000; Auh 2003; Ngai 2005; 
Dattée 2006; Sgouridis 2007; Weil 2007).  The most significant behaviors are misestimating 
demand growth, allowing financial discipline to lapse, totally unrealistic business planning, 
and misperception of technology trajectories. 
 
 The research described in this article calls into question the assumptions of rationality, 
transparency, efficiency, and homogeneity on which many models of markets are based (see 
for example Samuelson 1948; Bass 1969; Fisher and Pry 1971, Malkiel 1973).  The classic 
models assume, at least implicitly, that decision makers understand the structure of the 
market and how it produces the dynamics which can be observed or might potentially occur.  
Are these models acceptable simplifications, or can they be seriously misleading? 
 
 This article explains why markets routinely and repeatedly make “mistakes” that are 
inconsistent with the simplifying assumptions and often produce disastrously wrong business 
decisions.  The undesirable outcomes could include vicious cycles of investment and 
profitability, market bubbles, accelerated commoditization, excessive investment in dead-end 
technologies, giving up on a product that becomes a huge success, waiting too long to 
reinvent legacy companies, and changes in market leadership.  The article illuminates the 
effects of bounded rationality, imperfect information, fragmentation of decision making, and 
extrapolating past trends. 
 
 
 
The Mistakes Markets Make 
 
 
Misestimating Demand Growth 
 
 Misestimating demand growth usually is the result of inadequate understanding of 
how markets “work.”  For example, the U.S. airlines did not recognize the transient effects of 
deregulation.  Deregulation brought many new entrants into the market with lower costs and 
more aggressive, market-oriented management cultures.  A significant decline in real fares 
and expansion of flights stimulated a transient surge in demand.  For a period of 5-8 years, 
demand growth was far above the average rate before deregulation.  But this rapid growth 
was not sustained, and more recently demand in the U.S. grew at a rate in between the two 
extremes. 
 
 In addition, the airlines did not appear to understand how markets change as they 
mature.  As air transportation markets mature, the price elasticities increase steadily.  This 
reflects the predominance of discretionary, highly price-sensitive, non-business demand, e.g., 
tourism, visiting friends and family, in more mature markets.  Business travelers become 
more cost-sensitive, too.  And as markets mature, the GDP and flight frequency elasticities 
decline, as does the strength of any self-reinforcing “experience effect.”  A maturing market 
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is one where base demand is saturating, but discretionary demand can continue to grow in 
response to declining fares. 
 
 The consequences of over-estimating demand growth are shown in Figure 1 (Weil 
1996; Weil and Stoughton 1998).  Imagine a situation where demand growth accelerates.  
The higher rate of growth is projected in to the future, leading to greater desired capacity and 
increased aircraft orders.  As the new capacity joins the fleet, load factors may well decline. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Over-Estimating Demand Growth 
 
 
 Lower load factors are almost certain if the acceleration of demand growth is 
transient, e.g., because of deregulation or an economic up-cycle.  Load factors below target 
will lead to fare cutting which in turn will stimulate additional demand.  This is a self-
reinforcing “positive feedback loop” (highlighted as R1 in Figure 1).  More capacity leads to 
increased demand; more demand, to increased capacity.  Because of the long planning 
horizon and aircraft delivery times, excess capacity builds up in response to cyclical or 
surging growth in demand. 
 
 Planning errors are amplified by unusually long capacity delivery times.  The capacity 
planning horizon of the airlines is extended when delivery times increase.  Over-estimations 
of demand growth or market share, projected much farther into the future, cause even greater 
misjudgments of desired capacity.  As shown in Figure 2, these relationships form another 
self-reinforcing positive feedback loop (R2). 
 
 A surge in aircraft orders (as in 1988-90) can cause delivery times to become 
substantially longer than normal.  In response airlines extend their planning horizon, project 
higher demand and desired future capacity, and increase their aircraft orders.  Unless 
manufacturer production rates respond proportionally, their order backlogs and deliver times 
will grow substantially.  Here increased orders lead to longer planning horizons; and longer 
planning horizons, to further increases in orders. 
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Figure 2:  Amplification of Planning Errors 
 
 
Allowing Financial Discipline to Lapse 
 
 The two positive feedback loops shown in Figures 1 and 2 reinforce each other and 
amplify the growth of excess capacity.  The lapse of financial constraints within a market 
allows their perverse dynamics to go out of control.  Traditional barriers to entry into the 
market and conservatism in decision making are eroded by freely available financing, e.g., 
from capital markets, financial institutions, leasing companies, and aircraft manufacturers.  
For a while, the airline industry was “hot.”  Entrepreneurs had no difficulty raising the capital 
to launch new airlines.  New entrants ordered capacity in anticipation of building market 
share and, as described above, put market share growth ahead of short-term profitability. 
 
 When things turned bad for the industry, the normal industrial ecology did not apply.  
In the U.S., airlines are kept alive by the bankruptcy courts rather than going out of business.  
In other parts of the world, direct or indirect government subsidies have supported sick 
airlines.  The leasing companies, desperate to place aircraft, have offered amazing deals.  And 
the aircraft manufacturers, swamped with “white tails,” became the financiers of last resort.  
Thus instead of a rapid shake-out of the industry and rationalization of capacity, new capacity 
continued to flow in. 
 
 Figure 3 indicates another important negative feedback loop through airline 
profitability.  A wave of new capacity increases the airlines‟ expenses, reduces their 
profitability (for a time), and ordinarily would limit their access to financing and further 
capacity growth (loop B1).  The lapse of financial constraints severely weakened this 
feedback.  It has contributed very significantly to the growth and persistence of excess 
capacity. 
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Figure 3:  Laps of Financial Discipline 
 
 
 Market liberalization amplifies the dynamics described here by changing critical 
cause-effect relationships.  Liberalization allows new competitors to enter a market with 
lower costs than the established incumbents.  These may be start-ups or more efficient 
companies from other regions.  They under-price the established competitors, and add 
capacity in anticipation of market share growth.  For a period of time, they expect to operate 
with lower capacity utilization and to sacrifice profitability.  Of course, the established 
players try to defend their position through more aggressive pricing, cost reduction 
campaigns, and also a willingness to sacrifice profitability. 
 
 The principal cause-effect relationships changed by market liberalization are 
summarized in Figure 4.  The effect of capacity utilization on prices is stronger, and the 
effects of expenses and profitability are weaker.  Why?  Because new entrants price relative 
to the established players (attempting to under-price them) rather than based on their own 
costs.  And because all competitors are more willing to sacrifice profitability as part of their 
offensive and defensive strategies.  The expense drivers themselves are changed by the entry 
of lower cost competitors and the cost-cutting efforts of the established incumbents.  This is 
captured by the links to expenses from demand and capacity.  And as noted before, the effect 
of profitability on capacity orders is reduced. 
 
 The initial effect of market liberalization was to de-stabilize the airline industry.  The 
negative feedback structure that controls capacity growth is weakened, and excess capacity is 
almost inevitable.  What happens next depends on the barriers to exit.  If the normal industrial 
ecology is allowed to work, there will be a shake-out and consolidation of the industry along 
with rationalization of capacity.  In the mid-term, it is possible for an oligopoly to emerge and 
for the market to go through an extended period of stability.  If, however, the ecological 
solution is impeded by institutional barriers and governmental support excess capacity will 
persist indefinitely and the market will steadily commoditize. 
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Figure 4:  Effects of Market Liberalization 
 
 
Unrealistic Business Planning 
 
 The business plans of new market entrants often are highly optimistic, if not 
completely unrealistic.  This “success-oriented” bias may be necessary to win approval of the 
plan in a large established organization or secure funding for a start-up.  One sees the same J-
curve over and over again:  lose money for the first three years while building a customer 
base; breakeven in year four; and achieve cumulative profitability in year five or six.  It 
doesn‟t seem to matter if the business in question is a low-cost airline, broadband operator, 
producer of biofuels, or “web 2.0” social network. 
 
 The proliferation of players with unrealistic business plans further weakens the 
control mechanisms shown in Figures 3 and 4.  Specifically, more competitors in a market 
means more independent decision makers engaged in projecting demand, planning and 
ordering capacity, and setting prices.  The opportunities for misjudgments are increased.  In 
addition, the proliferation of competitors almost inevitably leads to a situation where their 
market share aspirations cumulate to far above 100% of the market.  New entrants start with 
nothing and expect to build market share.  The established companies, however, are not 
prepared to concede share to the same extent.  Market share objectives can cumulate to 150% 
or more of the actual market under such circumstances. 
 
 Another version of this phenomenon resulted from the growing prominence of aircraft 
leasing companies.  The leasing companies aggressively increased their market share targets, 
well beyond the capacity that the airlines planned to obtain from them.  In effect, they 
partially duplicated orders placed directly by the airlines.  Aircraft ordering based on these 
overlapping objectives leads to substantial excess capacity. 
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 The last effect is shown in Figure 3.  The fare cutting that results from lower load 
factors has an adverse impact on yields, revenues, and airline profitability.  Reduced profits, 
in turn, constrain aircraft orders.  This is a self-correcting “negative feedback loop.”  Excess 
capacity reduces profits; poor profits reduce aircraft orders, thereby allowing demand growth 
to absorb excess capacity.  The proliferation of competitors in a market weakens the feedback 
from profitability to orders, thereby increasing the likelihood of persistent excess capacity. 
 
 
Misperception of Technology Trajectories 
 
 The classic models of technology substitution, e.g., Bass (Bass 1969) and Fisher Pry 
(Fisher and Pry 1971), simplify the complex underlying dynamics.  The S-curve trajectories 
they produce have become iconic.  They dominate the mental models and expectations of 
business executives, entrepreneurs, investors, and consumers.  But recent research (Dattée 
2006; Dattée and Weil 2007) clearly shows that the stylized S-curve is just one of many 
possible substitution trajectories.  Under some circumstances the classic models are not 
acceptable simplifications. They can be seriously misleading.  It is essential to recognize that 
the substitution trajectory matters.  Assuming it always will follow the stylized S-curve can 
produce disastrously wrong business decisions. 
 
 The risks of planning errors is particularly high when the substitution trajectory is not 
a smooth, continuous S-curve, e.g., the “last gasp” scenario where a surge of improvements 
in the traditional technology postpones its replacement (a typology of technology substitution 
scenarios is described in Dattée 2006).  The highly refined clipper ship which extended the 
age of sail by several decades is an example of this scenario.  It would have been easy during 
the period 1850-70 for proponents of steam vessels first to overestimate the demand for the 
new technology and invest in excess capacity, then to underestimate demand and behave too 
cautiously.  The “intermediate hybrid” (motorized sailing ships, film cameras loaded with 
electronics) and “pathfinder” (citizen‟s band radio, the Apple Newton) trajectories pose 
comparable risks. 
 
 The “double-shift” scenario is even more dangerous.  Here the substitution trajectory 
of technology N+1 is cut short be the emergence of subsequent generation of technology.  
The initial penetration of technology N+1 is highly misleading.  It can create a frothy, 
exuberant environment, leading to massive over-investment in the skipped generation. 
 
 An extreme example of this scenario may well be occurring in wireless 
communications.  Five years ago there was great excitement about 3G mobile services 
(primarily based on WCDMA and CDMA2000 technology).  They offered the prospect of the 
“mobile Internet” including m-commerce and rich media.  Operators paid billions of dollars 
for 3G licenses which required additional billions of investment in new infrastructure.  
Penetration of 3G services has been slow.  Now WiFi (802.11__ and its successors) and 
WiMax are threatening to disrupt the penetration of 3G and commoditize these services. 
 
 For years the major mobile operators were dismissive of WiFi.  They said it was 
inferior to 2.5G and 3G mobile because of poor security, limited range, congestion problems, 
and of course no mobility.  It was something for PCs, not phones; for geeks, not most people.  
Then Research in Motion, Nokia, Apple, and other suppliers offered WiFi enabled handsets, 
and the fight was on.  The economics of WiFi and WiMax are highly favorable.  A large city 
can be covered for a small fraction of the cost of 3G mobile, and the cost of turning a store 
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into a WiFi “hotspot” is trivial.  Since a large percentage of wireless calls are initiated within 
buildings, who needs mobile except as a backup when WiFi is not available? 
 
 WiFi is a disruptive technology from an adjacent market.  It has a very different 
architecture from 3G and could easily capture a significant fraction of wireless 
communications.  WiFi doesn‟t need a big market share or sustainable financial model to be 
devastatingly disruptive.  Spoilers can do irreversible damage. 
 
 
Figure 5:  WiFi and 3G Mobile 
 
 
 The key dynamics of a generations of technology are presented in Figure 5.  Imagine 
these dynamics applying WiFi/WiMax.  As demand for WiFi services grows the total number 
of handsets and routers produced also increases.  Their unit cost declines because of learning 
curve effects and economies of scale.  Improved cost/performance enables new applications 
which increase the number of users and thus demand.  Improvements in cost/performance 
also drives more demand per user.  Growing demand stimulates investments in performance 
improvements, which feedback through both the number of users and intensity of use.  
However diminishing returns set in at some point, reducing the marginal productivity of these 
investments and ultimately constraining them. 
 
 Now imagine these dynamics applying simultaneously to 3G and WiFi/WiMax.  The 
reinforcing dynamics are much stronger for WiFi and WiMax than 3G.  The cost drops faster, 
performance improves faster, and intensity of use grows faster.  WiFi threatens to disrupt and 
commoditize 3G.  If this scenario occurs investment in 3G licenses and infrastructure will 
turn out to be an enormous destruction of shareholder value. 
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Why do These Mistakes Happen 
 
 
Bounded Rationality 
 
 Some authors frame these issues in terms of bounded rationality (for example, Simon 
1957; Forrester 1961; Morecroft 1985; Sterman 2000; Sterman et al 2007).  This principle 
recognizes that decision makers rely on simple mental models which have serious limitations.  
They become increasingly deficient as problems grow more complex, as the environment 
changes more rapidly, and as more people must participate in key decisions  “...agents make 
decisions using routines and heuristics because the complexity of the environment exceeds 
their ability to optimize even with respect to the limited information available to them” 
(Sterman et al 2007, p. 685). 
 
 Forrester in a pioneering article argued that failure to deal effectively with major 
social problems results from the intractability of complex non-linear feedback systems 
(Forrester 1973).  “My basic theme is that the human mind is not adapted to interpreting how 
social systems behave.  Our social systems belong to the class called multi-loop nonlinear 
feedback systems.  Evolutionary processes have not given us the mental skill needed to 
interpret properly the dynamic behavior of the systems of which we now have become a 
part.” (Forrester 1973, pp.211-212). 
 
 While discussing problems of population growth, economic development, pollution, 
and resource shortages Forrester drew on his extensive research into the behavior of complex 
business systems.  He explained that all decisions are taken based on models, primarily 
mental models, that mental models tend to be fuzzy and incomplete, and that usually there is 
a contradiction between the assumed structure and assumed consequences of mental models.  
Forrester concluded that the behavior of complex systems is counterintuitive.  “In many 
instances it then emerges that the known policies describe a system that actually causes the 
troubles.  In fact, a downward spiral develops in which the presumed solution makes the 
difficulty worse and thereby causes redoubling of the presumed solution” (Forrester 1973 pp. 
215-16). 
 
 Drawing on organizational cybernetics and System Dynamics Schwaninger attributed 
these dysfunctional behaviors to inadequate organizational intelligence.  “Every day, 
corporations suffering from „organizational dementia‟ inflict disastrous blows upon their 
economic, social and ecological environments, despite the fact that their members are, on 
average, intelligent and capable of learning.  This means that organizational intelligence 
cannot simply be equated with human intelligence” (Schwaninger 2006, p.7). 
 
 Classical models of technology diffusion are examples of bounded rationality.  In the 
interest of conceptual and computational simplicity they do not account for important 
interdependencies and structural fundamentals.  “Classical models make strong assumptions 
on the process of innovation diffusion by considering at least one of the following: that 
adoption is a one-step process, the potential market size is constant, there is no repeat 
purchase, there is a uniform probability of dyadic interactions between prior and potential 
adopters, or that the innovation itself does not change over the diffusion process.” (Dattée and 
Weil 2009, p.4)  This last assumption means that further developments in price and 
performance are ignored. 
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 The model shown in Figure 6 (from Dattée, FitzPatrick, and Weil 2007) generates an 
asymmetrical life cycle where there is a sudden drop in the sales of the current technology 
when it is confronted by the take off of a new generation.  This dynamic behavior is not 
replicated by classical analytical models of diffusion; yet historical data from different 
markets, e.g., multiple generations of DRAM, the transition from VHS to DVD, clearly 
corroborate this “substitutive drop.” 
 
 
Figure 6:  A System Dynamics Model of Technology Substitution 
 
 
 Another deviation from the stylized S-curve is the stair-step trajectory where 
penetration of a new technology evolves in a series of stages.  This pattern, shown in Figure 
7, reflects a highly heterogeneous segmentation of the market (Weil and Utterback, 2005).  
First, growth of the installed base overcomes initial skepticism and caution.  Next, 
improvements in cost and performance enhance the appeal of products based on the new 
technology.  Rising user requirements (influenced by increased marketing spend) add 
momentum to the substitution dynamics. 
 
 
Figure 7:  The Stair-Step Trajectory 
Willingness to Switch Products
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (Year)
Sales to new product frac
improvements in
price-performance
rising user
requirements
growth of  the
installed base
12 
 
 An example is digital cameras.  Many early adopters were professional photographers 
who used digital cameras to set up composition, lighting, and exposure before taking the 
picture with a “real camera.”  Penetration accelerated as the resolution of digital cameras 
improved, they became smaller and easier to use, and the price declined.  Further penetration 
is being driven by new requirements that are very difficult or impossible for film cameras to 
meet, e.g., posting pictures on Internet social networks. 
 
 
Confusing Cause and Effect 
 
 The research described in this article raises significant questions about cause and 
effect.  Commoditized industries generally are characterized by mature technologies and little 
innovation.  But is this the consequence of commoditization?  Does commoditization erode 
and eventually destroy the incentives and capabilities to innovate?  Or is commoditization the 
result of inadequate investment in technology and innovation? 
 
 The same questions can be asked about the high proportion of fixed costs in most 
commoditized industries.  Does this cause commoditization by exaggerating the difference 
between marginal and average cost?  Or is it the effect of pursuing economies of scale in a 
market with razor thin margins? 
 
 The research shows that these factors are both causes and effects of commoditization.  
The same is true for the tendency in commoditized industries to add capacity in ever larger 
blocks, and for there to be inadequate supplier capacity and hence exaggerated lead times 
during each up-cycle in capital investment. 
 
 Technological progress is very important in mitigating commoditization.  New 
technologies offer possibilities for differentiation, for example, supersonic travel, wireless 
Internet access, less-polluting fuels, fully integrated financial services.  Technology-driven 
enhancements in product and service capabilities can stimulate faster demand growth.  
Consider the impact of the Internet on demand for telecommunication services.  Less-
polluting fuels may prevent regulatory constraints on energy consumption.  And more rapid 
demand growth absorbs excess capacity more quickly. 
 
 In addition significant new technology can reward aggressive investors with a 
combination of lower costs, lower capital intensity, higher value added, and greater operating 
flexibility than their less aggressive competitors.  This is particularly apparent in the 
telecommunications industry.  By comparison the petroleum refiners are very cautious 
exploiters of new technology.  The results raise a provocative conclusion.  Commoditization 
easily can be a state of mind.  In that case it inevitably becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy! 
 
 
Extrapolating Past Trends 
 
 Demand growth in commoditized markets tends to follow an irregular "stair step" 
pattern, driven by the combination of recurring waves of over capacity and price cutting and 
macro-economic cycles.  Demand growth typically slows as an industry matures.  “This is 
both a cause and result of commoditization.  A point is reached where eroding margins 
produce pressures which counter-balance the downward effects of poor capacity utilization 
on price.  Ambitious new entrants seeking to build share, established companies defending 
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their positions, and even governments backing national champions all have their limits.  The 
result is to moderate price cutting and thereby slow subsequent demand growth” (Weil and 
Stoughton 1998 p.39). 
 
 Figure 8 is output from a simulation model of the US airline market (Weil 1996, Weil 
and Stoughton 1998).  This simulation and the results shown in Figures 9 and 10 were run in 
1997.  Demand growth is quite irregular, showing the distinctive “stair step” pattern.  
Demand (expressed in revenue passenger kilometers or “RPK”/year) is essentially flat during 
1999-2004 and again in 2009-11. 
 
 The average growth rate slows significantly.  It is much higher during 1985-96, i.e., 
3.4% p.a., than from 1997 to 2015, i.e., 1.9% p.a.  Demand growth surges in 1994, driven by 
strong economic conditions and in addition the market‟s reaction to declining fares during 
1995-96.  Then demand growth peaks in 1997 and cycles sharply downward.  This reversal is 
caused by rising fares and an assumed economic down-cycle.  A recession was assumed in 
2001-02 (which turned out to be correct). 
 
 
Figure 8:  Demand – US Airline Market 
 
 
 In many markets including airlines, telecommunications, and energy demand 
forecasting appears to be based on the extrapolation of past trends.  In a market with stair step 
demand growth this approach leads to systematic mis-estimation of demand and waves of 
excessive investment in capacity.  These outcomes can be seen in Figures 9 and 10.  
Extrapolating the demand trend during 1995-99 would significantly over-estimate demand in 
2000-05 (exactly what happened). 
 
 The peaks of capex in Figure 9 coincide with the end of a rapid growth phase in 
Figure 8, i.e., 1990 and 1998.  The underlying cause is evident in Figure 10, which is output 
from the same model applied to the US telecom market.  Projected demand is increasingly 
above actual demand, and the gap widens toward the end of each rapid growth phase, e.g., 
1998-2000 (the dotcom bubble) and 2006-08. 
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Figure 9:  Capacity Orders – US Airline Market 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Demand and Projected Demand – US Telecom Market 
 
 
 In a landmark article Roberts highlighted the deficiencies of both “exploratory” and 
“normative” approaches to technological forecasting.  Exploratory approaches attempt to 
predict the technological state of the art that will or might be in the future.  Normative 
approaches are used to allocate resources to technology development activities and thus shape 
the future technology landscape. 
 
 Roberts explained, “Exploratory technological forecasting includes a variety of 
techniques for predicting the future of science and technology.  Unfortunately most of the 
methods are really only variants on simple trend extrapolation procedures, broadly defined, 
that have limited utility in today‟s rapidly shifting technological environment.” (Roberts 
1978, p. 374). 
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 Roberts cites many failures of trend extrapolation and argues that the S-curve model 
of technological progress is just a more mathematically sophisticated form of trend 
extrapolation.  “This review of exploratory forecasting concluded that pathetically simply 
methods are being used to predict what technology will be in the future.  The techniques 
paralleled an earlier stage of growth of economic forecasting and as yet have not recognized 
the importance of causal dynamic models”  (Roberts 1978, p. 377).  He observed the 
disconnect between the exploratory and normative approaches and used Figure 11 to show 
how the two are interrelated. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Exploratory and Normative Forecasting 
 
 
 Roberts‟ critique still is valid.  The dynamic interaction between attempts to predict 
the future and resource allocation decisions determine how technological progress actually 
unfolds.  Not understanding this connection has led to repeated mistakes on both fronts:  
completely underestimating the demand for personal computers and hybrid cars; massive 
over-investment in broadband data networks, 3G mobile licenses, and corn-based ethanol; 
dismissing disruptive innovations such as voice over IP, digital cameras, WiFi, user-
generated media, and social networks; and being caught unprepared by the accelerated 
commoditization of information and communication technology infrastructure. 
 
 
 
What are Their Consequences 
 
 
Vicious Cycles 
 
 Capacity orders in commoditized markets tend to become increasingly cyclical over 
time, with the down-cycles becoming lower and more extended.  This has profound 
implications for both the industries in question and their suppliers.  Highly commoditized 
industries have periodic opportunities to introduce new technologies, but these are quite 
limited both in duration and relative to the installed base of capacity. 
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 Suppliers face an increasingly severe "feast or famine" marketplace.  They find it 
extremely difficult to maintain their production and technological capabilities during the 
periods of famine and to accurately anticipate the next feeding frenzy of orders.  Thus 
suppliers are likely to become risk averse and reactive, waiting until the next cycle is clearly 
underway before expanding capacity and launching new development programs.  In that case 
lengthy delivery delays, serious quality problems, and slowly evolving technology are the 
probable results.  This is the situation currently facing major parts of the commercial aircraft 
industry. 
 
 “The combination of slowing demand growth, eroding profitability, and inherently 
long asset lifetimes (generally 20-30 years in the industries studied) leads to stagnation of the 
industry's portfolio of capacity.  There are powerful incentives in a commoditized industry to 
stretch asset lives and invest as little as possible.  Significant „barriers to exit‟ which make it 
more difficult and/or costly to eliminate capacity (e.g., governmental support of national 
champions, protection by bankruptcy courts, or environmental regulations which impose 
large clean-up obligations) exacerbate those dynamics” (Weil 2007. p. 145). 
 
 The implication is quite clear:  any new technologies are adopted very slowly.  The 
outcome is a perverse technological lock-in.  Technologies which offer the possibility of 
moderating or escaping from the commodity game have a small impact.  The research 
indicates that this is a crucial part of the advanced stages of commoditization.  Industries, at 
least in their traditional forms, become trapped in a commodity business from which escape 
is increasingly unlikely. 
 
 
Market Bubbles 
 
 The entry of firms into a market and the subsequent exit of many or most competitors 
are central to the dynamics of innovation (Utterback 1994).   In the early stage of a new 
market or generation of technology the perceived opportunity is large.  No firm is dominant.  
The product or service is not highly refined and there are many competing variations.  As the 
number of companies in the market grows so does the rate of experimentation and 
innovation. 
 
 The entry rate is determined by the expected growth and profitability of the market 
and availability of finance.  In the early fluid stage of a new generation of technology the size 
of the prize is quite uncertain.  Thus a “lemming effect” often occurs, where the inflow of 
entrants reinforces the impression that this must be the “new big thing,” attracts a large 
amount of investment, and thus encourages additional firms to enter the market.  In a 
relatively short time there can be a surprisingly large number of companies in the market.  
These self-reinforcing dynamics were conspicuous during the dotcom boom (Weil and 
Utterback 2005).  
 
 The perceived risks of a new technology can be high in the early stage.  It is 
unproven, and potential users have reason to be skeptical and cautious.  Things start to 
change as the number of users increases.  The quantity and quality of information about the 
new technology improves, allowing more confident assessments and decisions.  Highly 
respected reference users legitimize a new technology and make its selection much easier to 
defend.  And products or services based on the new technology can become a fashionable 
“must have.”  This happens in business markets as well as consumer markets, e.g., the rush 
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by companies in the late 1990s to get on-line.  Then the risk is of not adopting, of being seen 
as “behind the times” or “not getting it.” 
 
 Social factors, e.g., trust, fashion, lead users, perception and extrapolation of trends, 
information flows, bandwagon effects, and network effects, often play a major role in market 
bubbles.  As described by Sterman (2000) bandwagon effects are driven by media coverage 
and positive word of mouth which create the perception of a hot product.  Network effects 
involve a strong positive feedback loop.  “As illustrated by the VCR industry, the utility of a 
product often depends on how many others are also using it” (Sterman 2000, p.370.).  These 
factors are particularly significant in determining how a market responds to innovative 
technologies, products, and business models. 
 
 Apple‟s spectacularly successful iPod highlights the importance of social factors in 
innovation and technology adoption.  Strong bandwagon and network effects reinforced the 
virtuous dynamics described by Weil and Utterback (2005).  Network effects occur when the 
value of a product or service increases non-linearly with the number of users, e.g., e-mail, 
text messaging, and social networks.  Bandwagon effects result from a fashion craze, 
something everyone must have.  The combination both effects is very powerful.  The iPod 
became a fashion craze. 
 
 
Accelerated Commoditization 
 
 Innovative technology is quite vulnerable to commoditization.  This term denotes a 
competitive environment in which product differentiation is difficult, customer loyalty and 
brand values are low, and sustainable advantage comes primarily from cost (and often 
quality) leadership. 
 
 Commoditization is driven by persistent excess capacity, which in turn is the result of 
over-estimation of demand, proliferation of competitors, easy availability of capital, pursuit 
of economies of scale, and barriers to exit (Weil, 1996; Weil, 2007).  Commoditization 
causes the emergence of a mass market for products based on the new technology but 
ultimately squeezes R&D, leading to technological stagnation.  Product cost-performance 
plateaus.  Sales growth continues, but with little or no profit.  Examples range from personal 
computers to digital media, wireless communications, and biologic drugs. 
 
 Mistaken assumptions about the substitution trajectory can trigger the dynamics of 
commoditization.  Overestimation of mid-term demand often stimulates a wave of new 
market entrants with ambitious objectives and aggressive investment plans.  When a new 
technology is “hot” it is easy for these companies to raise capital to finance investments in 
product development, production capacity, and infrastructure.  Over-estimation of demand 
growth and the proliferation of competitors stimulates excessive investment.  More 
competitors in a market means more independent decision makers.  “The opportunities for 
misjudgments are increased.”  (Weil, 1996, p. 12) 
 
 Excess capacity stimulates intense price competition.  Pipeline constraints often lead 
to long delays between capacity orders and when new capacity enters service, amplifying 
planning errors caused by extrapolation of past demand trends and over-optimism regarding 
the substitution trajectory.  This accelerates the build-up of excess capacity, especially when 
there are significant barriers to exit. 
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Investment in Dead-End Technologies 
 
 Consider the situation discussed above where a new technology N+1 emerges while 
the current technology N is diffusing into the market.  Figure 12 (from Dattée, FitzPatrick, 
and Weil 2007) shows that a simulation of these dynamics creates a large pre-emption effect 
by technology N+1 and this clearly results in what Dattée and Weil call a “substitutive drop” 
in the sales of N.  If unforeseen, this could have a devastating effect on the return on 
investments in technology N.  Indeed, one can see in Figure 12 “that by using the data up to 
the discontinuity point, a classical Bass model can be satisfactorily fitted to the life cycle of 
technology N.  However, it would completely miss the substitutive drop.” (Dattée and Weil 
2009, p.27)  Any further investment in technology N based on this expected profile could be 
a serious mistake. 
 
 “To overcome this structural mismatch, classical diffusion models are calibrated a 
posteriori with a smaller market size parameter and they anticipate the peak of sales as shown 
in figure 12c (Dattée, FitzPatrick, and Weil 2007, p.13).  This behavior is extremely clear in 
the application of Norton and Bass‟ multi-generations model to DRAM devices (Norton 
1986, Norton and Bass 1987, figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 12: The Substitutive Drop 
 
 
Giving Up Too Soon 
 
 Another example of “stair step” demand growth is the mature market for very 
expensive, long-lived assets such as military transport aircraft (Weil, 2004).  The 
conventional wisdom says these markets are lacking in opportunity, particularly for new 
entrants or new products, because their growth is quite slow, asset lives are long, operators 
have strong incentives to stretch the life of existing assets rather than replace them, and the 
markets are dominated by a small number of well entrenched suppliers.  Innovative 
technology can disrupt a mature market and change its dynamics. 
 
 Decision makers must contend with important tradeoffs.  Be an early buyer of the new 
model, or wait and see?  Replace old aircraft at the normal rate, at an accelerated rate, or 
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stretch their operational life until some of the uncertainties are resolved?  Select a new 
aircraft which better meets mission requirements and promises superior cost/performance, or 
play it safe with the well established old models?  The psychology of the market is critical in 
shaping these tradeoffs and decisions. 
 
 User confidence is driven by a potentially powerful reinforcing loop.  The more that 
operators select the new model, the larger the number of theses aircraft in the global fleet.  
Seeing the aircraft in operation builds confidence.  The mission effectiveness and 
cost/performance can be verified.  Early adopters are reassuring, especially if they are high 
prestige “reference users.”  For example, decision makers in Japan would find it much easier 
to justify selecting the new aircraft if the US or Germany had already done so and were very 
satisfied with its technology, performance, and economics. 
 
 Several other dynamics can come into play as the new aircraft penetrates the world 
fleet.  With most complex manufactured products there is a significant decline in unit cost as 
production grows.  Lower costs result from both learning curve effects and economies of 
scale.  Lower unit costs means a better cost/performance ratio for the new aircraft.  That will 
accelerate the obsolescence of older aircraft and increase the incentives and pressures to 
replace them with the new model. 
 
 As more of the new aircraft enter service user expectations can change.  They begin to 
take for granted its greater capabilities, which then become the norm.  Increased user 
expectations drive growth of their mission requirements, e.g., range, payload, flexibility, 
landing/takeoff conditions, and survivability.  Indeed the new model may enable entirely new 
missions.  Powerful tipping dynamics build momentum.  The network effects, economies of 
scale, and user expectations and requirements are all driving the market in favor of the new 
model.  The result is accelerated replacement of old aircraft. 
 
 The likely scenario in this case is summarized in Figure 13:  several waves of orders 
for the new aircraft separated by long periods of little or no further penetration.  The initial 
orders from launch customers are followed by a slow period where there is considerable 
interest in the new aircraft but few additional orders.  At this stage other potential buyers take 
a “wait and see” approach.  They lack sufficient confidence to select the new model. 
 
 
Figure 13:  An Example of the Stair-Step Trajectory 
 
 
• Initial orders from launch customers
• Second wave of orders
• Third wave of orders
• Accelerated replacement of old AC
• Fleet stabilizes
Year 0-1
Year 7-8
Year 10-11
Year 12-14
Year 16
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 When the first aircraft are completed and delivered there is a tangible product to 
evaluate. The cost/performance promise can be validated and satisfied lead users can serve as 
reassuring precedents.  After the new model enters service a second wave of orders occurs.  
As time passes the new aircraft is tested in action.  Its innovative technology produces very 
impressive mission performance which further increases user confidence and leads to a third 
wave of orders. 
 
 This substitution trajectory has serious strategic implications for both proponents of 
the new technology and incumbents.  There are very significant risks of misinterpreting the 
market dynamics and making major strategic errors during the early stages.  The innovator 
may give up in frustration during the first slow period.  It is easy for incumbent suppliers to 
be dismissive of the new technology.  The slow period seems to confirm that it has failed to 
gain momentum in the marketplace.  The dominant incumbents may feel confident and 
secure, and wait too long before taking the challenge seriously. 
 
 With the stair-step trajectory success or failure of the product based on innovative 
technology depends primarily on how the competitors behave.  If the innovator avoids 
mistakes and the established suppliers are complacent and slow to react, the outcome is 
success for the new technology.  If however the incumbents react quickly and effectively they 
can use their strength to exploit any missteps of the innovator and marginalize the new 
product.  The tipping dynamics are strong and unforgiving. 
 
 
Waiting Too Long to Reinvent 
 
 Misinterpreting the more complex substitution trajectories may delay attempts to 
reinvent legacy companies, strategies, and business models.  As a company matures its 
capabilities become more and more deeply embedded in business processes, relationships, 
and values.  The most likely result is what Sull calls “active inertia” (Sull, 1999).  Companies 
fail because the capabilities that made them successful become sources of rigidity.  This not 
only hampers their ability to innovate, but also channels their energy and activity in the 
wrong direction when faced with a major challenge. 
 
 Large, mature companies often lack the capabilities to be successful with a disruptive 
product or service innovation.  Christensen and Overdorf observed that they lose the ability to 
enter small, emerging markets (Christensen and Orverdorf, 2000).  Their values change and 
what once was an attractive opportunity now looks “not big enough to be interesting.”  
Established firms tend to dismiss a new technology as “inferior” by  traditional metrics.  
Disruptive innovations create new markets with different value propositions.  In order to 
succeed in these emerging markets organizations need new capabilities. 
 
 Henderson and Clark describe how “architectural innovations” destroy the capabilities 
of established firms (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  Architectural knowledge is embedded in 
their structure and information processing procedures.   The opportunities and threats posed 
by an innovation can be screened out by existing information filters.  And the need to build 
and apply new architectural knowledge conflicts with what made the firm successful in the 
first place. 
 
 Technological evolution is composed of periods of experimentation followed by the 
acceptance of a dominant design.  During the experimentation phase design exploration and 
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assimilation of new knowledge are essential.  New entrants have an advantage because they 
have fewer constraints. 
 
 The window of opportunity for creating new capabilities is limited.  Research by 
Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback shows that firms that enter a market during the “window 
of learning” just prior to the emergence of the dominant design will be less likely to exit 
(Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback, 1998).   In fast changing industries, rather than pure first 
mover advantage, there is a short window of opportunity before the emergence of a dominant 
design.  The timing of learning becomes critical, because with rapid technological change 
knowledge and capabilities quickly obsolesce. 
 
 Munir and Phillips highlight how constraining the concept of “industry” becomes 
during a period of disruptive innovation (Munir and Phillips, 2002).   It is an over-
simplification which distorts critical perceptions and decisions and often leaves large, 
established companies surprised by changes in the competitive environment.  They fail to 
understand who their key competitors are and how customer needs, expectations, and values 
have changed.  They do not realize that their knowledge and capabilities are becoming 
obsolete.  The most frequent outcome is a change in market leadership. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 Models which assume, at least implicitly, that decision makers understand the 
structure of the market and how it produces the dynamics which can be observed or might 
potentially occur can be dangerous simplifications and seriously misleading.  The research 
described in this article explains why markets routinely and repeatedly make “mistakes” that 
are inconsistent with the simplifying assumptions of rationality, transparency, efficiency, and 
homogeneity. 
 
 Decision makers rely on simple mental models which have serious limitations.  They 
become increasingly deficient as problems grow more complex, as the environment changes 
more rapidly, and as the number of decision makers increases.  The amplification and tipping 
dynamics typical of highly coupled systems, for example, bandwagon, network, and lemming 
effects, are not anticipated.  Behavioral factors play critical roles in the evolution of markets. 
 
 Markets become increasingly commoditized as they mature.  Commoditization is 
driven by persistent excess capacity, which in turn is the result of over-estimation of demand, 
proliferation of competitors, easy availability of capital, pursuit of economies of scale, and 
barriers to exit.   As markets grow more commoditized the sources of sustainable advantage 
become less tangible, e.g., IP, know-how, information, brand, reputation, relationships, trust, 
and the “customer experience.” (Weil and Weil 1999).  Competing on intangibles requires 
quite different capabilities from competing on product or service price and performance. 
 
 Risk taking by both suppliers and customers has significant impacts on the evolution 
of markets and creation of value from innovations.  The early stage is characterized by a 
frenzy of supply-side experimentation.  Many different product or service variations and 
business models are tried.  Multiple form factors and standards compete in the marketplace. 
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 The willingness to experiment and ability to learn are critical success factors at this 
stage (these issues are discussed by Henderson and Clark 1990; Roberts and Liu 2001; Munir 
and Phillips 2002; and Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 1998).   When companies are 
faced with radical technological changes decision-making cannot be based on existing 
understandings of customer needs, values, and expectations. 
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